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My name is Manuel F. Cohen. I am a lawyer and 
appear here today as chairman of the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities. With me is Lee J. Seidler, deputy chair­
man of the Commission, who will join me in answering your 
questions. Mr. Seidler is a non-practising certified 
public accountant. He is a professor of accounting at 
New York University and a business analyst and consultant. 
The other members of the Commission are: Walter S. Holmes, 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer of a 
large finance-based diversified company, a non-practising 
CPA; William C. Norby, a chartered financial analyst and 
senior vice-president of a Chicago-based firm of professional 
investment advisors, and a former president of the Financial 
Analysts Federation; LeRoy Layton, formerly managing partner 
of an international firm of accountants and auditors, a 
former president of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and chairman of the Accounting Principles 
Board; Kenneth W. Stringer, senior technical partner in an 
international firm of accountants and auditors; and John J. 
van Benten, the managing partner of a midwestern regional 
firm of accountants and auditors.
At the outset, we wish to thank the Subcommittee 
for this opportunity to appear today. I understand a summary 
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of our Report of Tentative Conclusions has already been 
added to the public record, and that certain members of 
the Subcommittee and its staff have received copies of the 
Report. Copies have also been sent to Representative John 
E. Moss of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce. The summary is too brief to provide an adequate 
understanding of our recommendations or a basis for com­
parison with other recommendations submitted to this Sub­
committee, some of which we considered and discussed in 
our Report. Accordingly, we suggest that the entire Report 
be included in the record of these hearings.
Nearly 50,000 copies of the Report have been dis­
tributed to CPA firm offices and to a large number of in­
dividuals and organizations concerned with financial re­
porting and the role of the auditor. At the request of 
interested organizations, members of the Commission have 
been attending numerous seminars and other meetings. The 
Report is or will be a topic of discussion at annual and 
regional meetings of the Financial Executives Institute, 
the American Accounting Association, the American Institute 
of CPAs, the National Accounting Association and other 
groups.
I should also note that we have arranged a public 
meeting in Washington beginning on June 21 to receive oral 
presentations with respect to our Report. We have also 
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asked for more detailed comment, criticism or suggestions 
in the form of written submissions. Upon the completion 
of the meeting and review of the written submissions and 
so much of the record of these hearings as may be available 
to us, we will review our tentative conclusions and develop 
a Final Report, hopefully by the end of this year.
Before I describe the more significant conclusions 
of our Report, a few words concerning the background of the 
study and our methodology may be useful.
Background of the Commission's Study
The Commission was created as an independent body 
by the American Institute of CPAs in the fall of 1974 in 
response to growing criticism of the accounting profession. 
The Commission was asked to study the role and responsibili­
ties of independent auditors and to make recommendations 
designed to narrow an apparent gap between the needs and 
expectations of users of financial statements and the per­
formance of auditors. A study of such broad scope had 
never been undertaken.
All members of the Commission serve without re­
muneration. The financial arrangements whereby our direct 
expenses are reimbursed by the AICPA are disclosed in our 
Report. We have had no directions or restrictions as to 
the scope of our study or recommendations.
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We viewed the scope of our study broadly. Orig­
inally, we intended to deal with the full range of problems 
surrounding auditing. We decided later that some limita­
tions were necessary to enable us to concentrate on audits 
of publicly owned corporations since the public interest is 
most widely affected by this activity. We believe we have 
addressed the principal issues that relate to the concerns 
of our society over the state of the auditing profession.
We found it necessary to undertake a great deal 
of research first to identify correctly the major issues 
within the framework of our charge and then to determine 
the courses of action necessary to gather the data and 
Other evidence relevant to an understanding of perceived 
problems and recommendations to deal with them. Subject 
to modifications appropriate in the light of comment on 
our Tentative Conclusions, we believe our recommendations 
when implemented will deal effectively with these problems. 
We also believe that additional costs which may result 
from the adoption of our recommendations will not be ex­
cessive when compared with the benefits.
Our research was extensive and diverse. We 
reviewed previously published materials and sponsored 
numerous research projects, surveys, and case studies. 
We sought information from many knowledgeable individuals 
including accountants in other countries, the chief ac­
countants of many government agencies and the staffs of 
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the SEC and the General Accounting Office, through dis­
cussions, interviews and participation in seminars. We 
also sought and obtained the views of users and preparers 
of financial information — security analysts, investment 
advisors, officials of banks and other financial institu­
tions, professional and amateur investors, academicians 
and officers of industrial and commercial enterprises. We 
reviewed the vast amount of material available to us and 
drew on the diverse experience of the members of the Com­
mission to arrive at what we believe are the most appro­
priate conclusions.
Implementation of Recommendations
Implementation of some of our recommendations 
will require action by the AICPA, the FASB, the SEC and 
other agencies and institutions. Many are directed at 
individual auditors, boards of directors, management, 
other elements of the corporate community and can be adopted 
without formal or institutional regulation. For example, 
our recommendation that audit committees take an active 
role in the process by which the independent auditor is 
selected, the scope of his engagement developed, his fee 
determined and his work monitored can be adopted quickly 
be any board. We urge individual auditors and their 
clients to implement our recommendations without delay.
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Several of our recommendations — perhaps our 
most fundamental recommendations — do not lend themselves 
to immediate implementation. These call for a change in 
traditional thinking by auditors, corporate directors and 
management and the development of improved standards. 
Where possible, we have recommended specific actions to 
facilitate implementation.
The Expectation-Performance Gap
At the outset, I should note briefly our overall 
conclusions. We concluded that a gap between expectations 
and performance does in fact exist; that, to a large extent 
public expectations are not unreasonable; that many of them 
are within current or potential capabilities of auditors; 
that others are clearly beyond the capabilities of auditors 
and are based upon misconceptions as to the role, respon­
sibility and capability of auditors; but that certain steps 
could be taken by the corporate community to meet those 
expectations more fully. Thus, expectations that the 
auditor’s report is in the nature of a guarantee of the 
complete accuracy of the financial statements, or of the 
continued operational and financial success of the issuer 
of the financial statements, are based upon misconceptions 
Of the nature and limitations of the audit process and the 
message intended to be conveyed by the auditor’s report.
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So also, expectations that all major contingencies facing 
the issuer will be properly exposed — particularly those 
involving necessary judgments by persons trained in law 
and acting as legal advisors to the issuer — cannot be 
fully satisfied by the auditor. I should note, however, 
that in our Report we deal with these matters and have 
included recommendations for meeting these expectations.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Statements
Perhaps our most basic conclusions are contained 
in chapter 2 of the Report in which we discuss the process 
by which the auditor forms an opinion on financial state­
ments. Auditors have been charged with losing sight, on 
occasion, of the fundamental purpose of the audit and the 
needs of the users of financial statements. It has also 
been suggested that, at times, auditors have mechanically 
followed their procedures and standards and failed to step 
back to view their work in perspective and to test whether 
the financial statements reflect underlying realities.
We found that auditors sometimes construed too 
narrowly generally accepted accounting principles and 
failed to exercise the judgments required by GAAP in 
reaching a determination whether the accounting principles 
selected by the client are appropriate to and consistent 
with the underlying facts and not the result of a search 
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for the most favorable presentation. We believe that, in 
all but a limited number of situations, the auditor is able 
to determine which of the alternative principles seemingly 
relevant is preferable in the circumstances.
Finally, auditors have neglected, on occasion, 
to evaluate the cumulative effect on the financial state­
ments of the selection and application of accounting prin­
ciples to discrete underlying transactions. The selection 
and application of selected accounting principles to separate 
activities of a company may be within the bounds of account­
ing standards in isolation. The mechanical aggregation of 
these separate decisions may, however, produce misleading 
results. The professional auditor can avoid such a result 
by proper exercise of care and judgment.
We recommend that auditors be required to deter­
mine that the accounting principles selected are the most 
appropriate among alternatives except in those very few 
situations when there is no basis to make such a determina­
tion. We also recommend that auditors be specifically and 
expressly required to evaluate the cumulative effect of 
accounting principles choices on the financial statements.
Internal Control
Fundamental to a number of our recommendations 
is the function of the internal control system in the cor­
porate financial reporting system. The maintenance of a 
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strong system of internal control is the most effective 
means of assuring reliable financial information and of 
limiting fraud and illegal payments or other actions in­
consistent with corporate policy. But auditors are not 
required to comment on the adequacy or quality of the 
client’s internal controls or to insist that the client 
comment in an appropriate note to the financial statements 
or otherwise.
We believe that a major emphasis of the audit 
should be on an expanded review of the company’s internal 
/ control system so that the auditor can conclude with rea­
sonable assurance that the system is free of material 
weaknesses. Coupled with an obligation on the issuer to 
comment on the system, such an auditing requirement would 
serve as an effective incentive to management to take 
prompt steps to eliminate weaknesses.
Reports by Management and the Auditor
We believe that we have developed a more useful 
approach than the form of report currently in use for com­
municating information concerning the financial reporting 
system and the nature and meaning of the audit. The Com­
mission proposes that annual financial statements include 
a report on those financial statements and the underlying 
system of internal controls from management as well as a 
report from the auditor. The management report would 
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indicate management’s primary responsibility for the prepara­
tion of the financial statements and would include information 
with respect to major contingencies, the adequacy of the 
system of internal control and other matters such as cor­
porate policies intended to preclude or to minimize oppor­
tunities for the commission of illegal acts.
The proposed auditor’s report would be an infor­
mative description of the nature and limitations of the 
audit work performed and, to the extent appropriate, would 
comment on the adequacy of the management report on the 
financial statements and related matters such as the nature 
and adequacy of the internal control system, rather than, 
as now, a bare opinion which, we have found, is not under­
stood by many and not read by others. Our suggested form 
of report would allow for variations in content to fit 
different circumstances.
The provision of these two reports, which we 
believe should be written in language understandable to 
readers, would lead to an improved understanding by all 
users of financial reports of the nature of the reporting 
and the auditing process and of the responsibilities of 
management and of the auditor.
New Framework of the Audit Function
Our recommendation that the audit be viewed as 
a review of the overall financial reporting system would 
allow further innovation. We concluded that the present 
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focus of an audit on a specific set of financial statements 
issued once a year is too narrow and obsolete. The process 
of reporting financial information by companies is continuous 
throughout the year. Rather than the traditional once-a- 
year audit of financial statements, the audit should be 
considered as involving an examination of the entire report­
ing system to be performed over time. Development of the 
proposed new framework would result in a more reliable 
reporting system and provide a vehicle for orderly evolution 
and expansion of the audit function. And a more reliable 
reporting system would produce interim financial statements 
on which the auditor would be able to provide a higher degree 
of assurance than he can now provide.
Management Fraud and Illegal Acts
A major portion of the Commission’s study was 
directed at the auditor’s responsibilities for the detec­
tion and disclosure of management fraud and illegal acts. 
Auditors have been reluctant to acknowledge an affirmative 
responsibility to search for fraud and illegal acts out of 
fear that failure to detect such matters would be equated 
with substandard performance.
Of course, an audit cannot guarantee that all 
frauds and illegal acts will be detected. The Commission 
has concluded, however, that the audit should be appro­
priately designed, and an affirmative obligation of the 
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auditor to search out material fraud based upon a standard 
of "due professional care" be clearly spelled out, as a 
basis for providing greater assurance that financial 
statements are not affected by material fraud.
We reached a similar conclusion with respect to 
illegal or questionable acts. We recommended a three-step 
program by which the auditor would more usefully be involved 
in the detection and exposure of such acts. The program 
would consist of:
1. The development and wide publication 
by the board of directors of the client company 
of a policy statement that specified unacceptable 
behavior in reasonable detail.
2. The development and implementation, 
in consultation with the auditor, of a system 
of controls and procedures to monitor com­
pliance with the policy statement, and
3. Review of the control system by the 
auditor to test its continuing effectiveness. 
One of the major issues in the controversy over 
the auditor’s responsibility for illegal or questionable 
acts by management is the relationship to the concept of 
materiality. Conventional concepts of materiality, based 
principally on quantitative considerations, are inappli­
cable to known illegal or questionable acts. The auditor 
13
should not take it upon himself to determine that some 
violations of law or propriety are more or less serious 
than others. The auditor must give the act appropriate 
attention regardless of the amounts involved. By ’’appro­
priate attention”, we mean pursuing the matter until sat­
isfactory disposition is obtained. Lacking satisfactory 
disposition in such cases, which might include adequate 
disclosure in the management letter accompanying the 
financial statements or otherwise, the auditor would be 
required to comment, particularly where they violate 
published corporate policies.
While the Statements of Auditing Standards on 
fraud and illegal acts recently issued by the AICPA — 
prior to the publication of our Report — do not go as 
far as we would like, we are pleased to note that they 
include a number of suggestions contained in our Report.
MAS and Independence
An issue of particular concern to the Subcom­
mittee, also addressed in our Report, relates to manage­
ment advisory services provided by auditors. Certain 
management advisory services are a potential threat to 
auditor independence. We examined the literature and 
other materials bearing on the matter, including the 
views of leading critics of such activities by independent 
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auditors. However, we did not find any cases in which 
management services in fact led to audit failure and 
could not objectively conclude that a blanket prohibition 
of all MAS is warranted.
We do, however, recommend that boards of direc­
tors and audit committees become more actively involved 
in the process of selection and performance of management 
advisory services. We also recommend that executive 
placement services that involve a clear conflict of interest 
for the auditor be prohibited. Our most important recommen­
dation in regard to MAS is that all services provided to the 
client by the auditor be disclosed in management’s proxy 
statement. Such disclosures would provide much needed 
information as to the extent and nature of services pro­
vided and a basis for evaluating conflicts or the appear­
ance of conflicts.
Time Pressures and Substandard Performance
A large part of our research was directed at 
determining the causes of substandard audit performance. 
Apart from our analysis of specific past audit failures, 
we sponsored an extensive survey of the views of auditors 
at every level as to inadequacies in the performance of 
audit personnel. The survey developed information which 
indicated that time and budget pressures, prompted by a  
variety of factors within a firm, appear to be the prin­
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cipal causes of substandard performance. In part, these 
pressures stemmed from arbitrary and unrealistic dead­
lines imposed by clients. Competitive pressures were 
also cited.
We recommend that firms examine their budgeting 
and scheduling policies to make sure they do not lead to 
the type of unnecessary pressures on personnel that have 
resulted in substandard audits. A review of time budget­
ing procedures should be included in every quality control 
program.
Again, I want to thank the Subcommittee for 
inviting us to participate in these hearings. I believe 
they will result in much useful action by the profession 
that might not otherwise have been undertaken. Now Pro­
fessor Seidler and I, indeed all of my colleagues, would 
be happy to answer any questions you may have on the 
points I just reviewed or on any of the other recommen­
dations or conclusions in our Report.
